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Introduction
As the wave of litigation by alleged victims of clergy sexual

misconduct against the Catholic Church made its way through the
judicial system at the turn of the new century, one diocese after
another

began

hinting

that

it

might

respond

by

filing

for

bankruptcy. In 2004, the dam burst. The Boston Archdiocese, the
diocese that seemed most likely to end up in bankruptcy, resolved
its litigation through a global settlement.
Portland did not, and on July

But the Archdiocese of

6, it filed for Chapter

11.

vVithin a

few months, Portland was joined by two more dioceses, Tucson
1
and Spokane.
* S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvania Law
School. I am grateful to Seth Chertok and Yang Liu for research assistance and to
Jonathan Lipson and to the participants at the "Bankruptcy in the Religious Non
Profit Context" conference at Seton Hall University School of Law on November 5,
2004, for helpful comments.
) See, e.g., Matt Miller, 17w Church and ChajJter 11, DAILY DEAL, Aug. 6, 2004
(discussing Portland diocesan bankruptcy filing and noting that Boston Archdiocese
settled with 552 claimants in September 2003) [hereinafter Miller I]; Larry B.
Stammer, 01oegon Diocese }'irst to File Bankruptc)l, L.A. TIMES, July 7, 2004, at Al
(Portland filing); Matt Miller, Tucson Diocese Details Prepach, DAlLY DEAL, Sept. 22,
2004 (Tucson diocesan filing September 20, 2004) [hereinafter Miller II]. In the

345

346

[Vol. 29:2

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVEJOURNAL

The filings sent bankruptcy lawyers and scholars scrambling
for their pocket Bankruptcy Codes.

As it turns out, they needn't

have bothered, at least if they were looking for explicit guidance
on church bankruptcy.

The word "church" is nowhere to be

found in Chapter 11 or any other corner of the bankruptcy laws.
To use the cliche that seemed to crop up in every discussion,
church bankruptcy is uncharted waters for a bankruptcy process
2
that is designed with ordinary businesses in mind.

Of particular concern was the danger that the bankruptcy
laws,

which

provide

for

extensive oversight

of

the

debtor's

finances, might interfere with the religious affairs of the church,
thus running afoul of the First Amendment guarantee of free
exercise of religion.

It isn't often that bankruptcy experts and

constitutional law scholars participate in the same conversations.
But the church bankruptcies have religious freedom experts using
terms

like

"property

of

the

estate,"

and

bankruptcy

experts

puzzling over "deference" and "neutral principles" as they attempt
to

chart

the

lines

between

the

Chapter

11

reorganization

framework and the church's ministries and religious mission.
This article focuses on the three contexts where the tension
between free exercise and the bankruptcy process comes most
:1
clearly to the fore.
To try to make sense of these issues, I will
analogize the church bankruptcy cases to two other entities that
may seem at first glance to have little in common with churches:
municipalities and sovereign nations. The common theme is this:
With

municipalities

and

sovereign

nations,

as with

religious

entities, bankruptcy oversight creates tensions that can be loosely
described as "sovereignty concerns."
The similarities between church and municipality bankruptcy
- which is governed by Chapter 9 , a special set of provisions
'
designed specifically for municipalities - are particularly striking.
Indeed, I suspect that if the drafters of the bankruptcy laws had

months since this Article was written, the Tuscon diocese has confirmed a consensual
reorganization plan in July 2005. The Portland and Spokane cases are still in
Chapter 11.
�
See, e.g., Miller I, supra note 1 (quoting Msgr. Thomas Cahalane).
:1 In an earlier article, I explored the question whether it is appropriate for
churches to file for bankruptcy, and what obstacles a church might face. David A.
Skeel,Jr., Avoiding iVIoral Bankruptcy, 44 B.G. L REv. 1181 (2003 ).
i 11 U.S.G.§9 01 etseq. (2005).
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envisioned the possibility of a church bankruptcy filing, they
would have either included religious organizations within Chapter

9 or adopted an analogous set of provisions for religious
organizations.

VVnile sovereign bankruptcy is theory rather than

fact, the International Monetary Fund and some commentators
"
have called for such a framework in recent years. Many of the
issues that have been debated in the sovereign debt context closely
parallel

the religious freedom issues that arise in a church

bankruptcy.

A key concern, for instance, is that any sovereign

bankruptcy regime not interfere with the sovereign's internal
decision making.
The Article proceeds as follows.

I begin, in Part II, by

considering the much debated question of what property comes
into the bankruptcy "estate" when a diocese files for Chapter 1l."
The most pressing issue is whether the churches, schools, and
other property in

property,

or

a

whether

diocese should be treated as
they

belong

to

the

local

diocesan
parish

or

parishioners and are thus off limits to creditors in a diocesan
bankruptcy.

Part III considers whether bankruptcy's disclosure

and oversight rules are likely to interfere with a church's free

exercise rights.

Finally, Part IV addresses several confirmation

issues - issues that arise when the church debtor seeks to confirm
a reorganization plan.
whether

a

church

Here, a particularly tricky question is

debtor

can

use

the

so-called

cramdown

provisions, and confirm a reorganization plan over the objections
of the clergy misconduct victims if negotiations with the victims
break down.'
To- paraphrase the line generations of law students have been
tempted to use each time they answer an exam question, these are
difficult issues that do not admit of a simple answer. With each of
the issues, I will offer my own conclusions as to the best resolution.
But I will also suggest that the best strategy for a bankruptcy judge

For discussion of the IMF proposal and other proposed sovereign bankruptcy
regimes, see for example, Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Private Sector
Involvement in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A New Role for the IMF? (2005)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin
,
Zettelmeyer, Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A Hist01) of Ideas, 1976-2001, 49 lMF
STAFF PAPERS 470 (2002).
6 Property of the estate is governed by 11 U.S. C. § 541.
i The cramdowl1 provisions are set forth in 11 U .
S.C. § 1] 29 (b) .
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may be to finesse several of the issues, and to prod the parties to
reach a consensual agreement on the terms of the reorganization
plan.

II.

Who Owns the Property?
When a sovereign nation or a municipality cannot pay its

obligations, much of its property is off limits to creditors.

With

sovereign debtors, sovereign immunity kee ps creditors' hands off
property within the sovereign's boundaries.' The laws of most U.S.
states

achieve

a

similar

effect

for

municipalities.

Although

municipalities do not enjoy absolute protection, property used for
9
governmental operations is immune from creditors.
Church property is treated much more like the property held
by

private

businesses.

Unlike

with

sovereign

debtors

or

municipalities, the foreclosure rules generally do not provide
special protections for churches. III

Sovereignty issues do not

disappear in the church property context, however. Sovereign-ty 
in the form of religious freedom concerns - comes into play when
courts are asked to determine which church entity should be seen
as owning the church's property. If a local church wishes to jump
ship

from

its

denomination

denomination,
own

the

does

church

the

local church or the
/
building
Answering these

questions has forced courts to negotiate the line between resolving
ordinary
X

property

disputes

interfering

with

a

church's

David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should A
53 EMORY LJ. 762, 781-82 (2004)
(immunity of sovereign assets from seizllre).
l) See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell & Randal C.Picker, When Cities Co Broke: A
ConcetJ/llal Introduction to jv
' lunicij)a/ Bankru/Jtcy, 60 U. CHI. L. RE\'. 425, 429-34 (1993)
(limitations on seizure of municipal property).
III
For an old case that underscores this point, and at the same time suggests a
reluctance to allow a foreclosure, see J'vlannix v. Purcell, 19 N.E. 572 (Ohio 1 8S8)
(preventing creditors from foreclosing on church assets to satisry personal creditors
of the bishop). Thanks to Jonathan Lipson for bringing this case to my attention.
II
The case law on these church property disputes is surveyed and analyzed in
detail in Patty Gerstenblith, Civil Court Resolution of Property Disputes Among Religious
01ganizations, 39 AM. U. L. RE\·. 513 (1990). After this Article was drafted, and shortly
before it went to press, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Washington issued a ruling on the property issue in the Spokane case. The decision,
which is being appealed, reaches very similar conclusions to those argued for in this
part. In Ie Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. 304 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2005)
(holding that the church's real property is part of the bankruptcy estate).
See, e.g.,

Patrick Bolton

and

&

Sovereign BankruptlY Framework Be Structured?,

2005]
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internal religious functions.
Ownership issues have figured prominently in the recent
church

bankruptcies

(and

near

bankruptcies),

resolution remains subject to fien:e dispute.

and

their

A key question in

each of the cases is this: Are the cathedrals and schools in a
diocese owned by the diocese, the parish, the local parishioners,
or someone else?

To understand the dispute, we should begin by

briefly considering the ownership of church assets under church
and secular law.
In the nineteenth century, faced with the ticklish question of
how religious organizations should be recognized in the secular
law,

many states passed statutes creating the corporate form

known as a corporation sole. I� A corporation sole is a person - in
this case the bishop

and his or her successors, who are treated in
n
much the same way as a secular corporation.
Many Catholic
-

dioceses are set up as a corporation sole.

In some dioceses, the

parishes within the diocese are incorporated separately as non
profit corporations. In others, the parishes have not been housed
•

111

•

separate corporatIOns.
In

dioceses

11

whose

parishes

have

not

been

separately

incorporated, the basic ownership structure seems to suggest that
the churches, schools, and other property are owned by diocese.
But church officials have argued, under both canon and secular
law, that this appearance is mistaken.

First, according to one

argument, which draws on both canon and secular law, church
property is held in trust for the parishioners of the parish where it
is located.

On this view, the bishop is the trustee of a trust, but

ownership is vested in the parishioners, as beneficiaries. I;

A

I� See, e.g., Miller I, s'UjJm note 1 ("Religious historians trace corporation sole to
the early 19th century.").
13 For a representative corporate sole statute, see UTAH Dr\'. Of CORJ)S. AND
COMMERCIA:L CODE, CORPORATION SOLE: How To INCORPORATE (2002) (on file with
author) .
Ii
See, e.g., Miller 1, s'UjJ1a note I (noting that Portland parishes are not separately
incorporated, whereas in 2003 "the eastern Oregon diocese of Baker transferred
parish properties from a corporation sole to more than 60 separate corporations
held by boards of trustees").
Ij
Ie!. ("The church steadfastly maintains that while parish property is held in the
name of the office of a bishop or archbishop, it is a trust relationship. That is
codified in canon law. As a result, the church says, parish property should be
excluded from an inventory of assets.").

SETON HALL LEGISLATn/EJOURNAL
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second argument is that canon law requires that church property
be held at the parish level, rather than at the diocesan level.
Under this view, the true owners of the property are the parishes,
rather than the diocese or the parishioners.
How should these conflicting interpretations be resolved?
Start with the nonbankruptcy analysis of the trust issue. Under the
leading Supreme Court case,

Jones

v.

Wolf,

I.;

states can adopt and

courts apply a "neutral principles" approach to property issues
that implicate both state and religious law.

If property ownership

can be determined without interpreting religious doctrine, courts
are permitted to wade in; otherwise, the issue must be left to
church officials.

In the church property cases, a key question is

whether to recognize the existence of a trust. If the trust relations
are set out explicitly, the arrangement may qualify as an express
trust under secular law. With most dioceses, this level of formality
does not seem to be present, though in some cases it may be. In
the absence of an express trust, it is possible that a court would
find an implied trust running from the bishop to the_ parishes or
l
parishioners, although here too the answer is unclear. •
Now turn to bankruptcy.
great

lengths

to

replicate

property law issues. Section

Bankruptcy law generally goes to
the

nonbankruptcy

treatment

of

541, which determines what property

becomes part of the bankruptcy estate, is designed to brin& in
'
everything that the debtor owns and nothing that it does not.
If
the debtor owns a partial interest in property, for instance, the
partial interest becomes property of the estate but the remainder
does not.

Of

particular relevance for our

purposes,

§ 541

Iii 443 O.S. 595 (1979). In the Spokane case, the court noted that "Washington
uses the "compulsory deference" approach rather than neutral principles, but
concluded that, because the bankruptcy property issue is n'ot an intra-church
dispute, a similar analysis applies. In re Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. at 323
(concluding that "the First Amendment does not prevent application of a law or
body of law which is facially neutral and generally applied in the jurisdiction to a
religious organization") .
Ii
A trial court concluded that the Boston archdiocese's ownership rights were
not subject to an implied trust. Akoury v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 2004 Mass.
Super. LEXIS 349, *7 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Sept. 14,2004) ("There is simply no evidence
here to warrant a finding of a resulting trust in real estate."). For a discussion of the
implied trust issue, see Gerstenblith, S1tjJ)"{t note 11, at 550-66.
IX
Under 11 U.s.C. § 541 (a) (1), "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property as of the commencement of the case" are treated as part of the "estate."
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'specifically states that only the debtor's legal title, not any
equitable interest in property , becomes part of the estate if legal
19
title is all that the debtor holds. Thus, if a diocesan debtor holds
legal title to a church or school as the trustee of a trust , with the
beneficial interests belonging to the parishes or parishioners , only
the bare legal title would come into the estate.
This initial determination does not end the analysis , however.
There is more to the story. The trustee (or debtor-in-possession)
is given the power to augment the estate by retrieving preferential
pre-bankruptcy payments and avoiding some interests that might
be recognized outside of bankruptcy. Of particular relevance is §
544(a) (3), which permits the trustee to eliminate any interest that
,,211
could be voided by "a bona fide purchaser of real property.
The
language is confusing , but the concept is simple: The trustee can
eliminate any property interest that would have been trumped
outside of bankruptcy by a sale to a bona fide purchaser.
This issue comes into play with church bankruptcies in
connection with the argument that diocesan property is held in an
implied or constructive trust for the parishes or parishioners.
Would a constructive trust be trumped by a sale to a bona fide
purchaser? The answer seems to be yes. "Under most states'
laws ," as Judge Easterbrook puts it in a leading case , "the buyer in
good faith of real property can obtain a position superior to that of
the rightful owner, if the owner neglected to record his interest in
the filing system. Section 544(a) (3) gives the trustee the same sort
,,21
of position.
When we import Easterbrook's reasoning, which arose in an
ordinary bankruptcy case, into the church context, it may initially
seem to raise church-state concerns. The Bankruptcy Code seems
to override the teaching of the church as to how property should
be held. But the conflict is more illusory than real. It is quite
simple for the church to set up an explicit trust arrangement, or
to separately incorporate the parishes within a diocese and vest
title in the parishes where the churches or schools are located. If
a church has not taken these steps , by contrast, finding an implied
trust to have existed and then honoring it in bankruptcy would be
19Id, § 541(d),
Id, § 544 (a) (3).

211
21

Belisle

v,

Plunkett, 877 F,2d 512 (7th CiL 1989),

352

SETON HALL LEGISLA TIVEJOURNAL

[Vol. 29:2

a recipe for trouble. It would "obfuscate land titles and [] make
real estate transactions more complex and costly," as one
commentator puts it, since potential purchasers might have no
idea that the property was subject to an implied trust, even if they
��
diligently searched the real estate records.
Thus far, I have treated the property ownership issue as a
doctrinal question, but there is a more practical point as well. The
best solution to the property question may be for the bankruptcy
court to avoid resolving it.
Chapter 11 is designed to be a
negotiated process, and everyone may be better off if the parties
devise a reorganization plan that finesses the question of whether
the diocese owns the property.
From the diocesan debtor's
perspective, resolving the question could put it in the awkward
position of arguing in the bankruptcy court that it doesn't own the
property, but then later wishing to switch sides and act as if the
diocese does own the property if the time comes to shut down or
sell a church or school. Indeed, the dilemma is not simply
hypothetical. Mter suggesting several years ago that its property is
held in trust for its parishioners, the Boston Archdiocese has
recently argued that it has the authority to close and possibly sell a
�\
number of churches in the Archdiocese. The victims and their
lawyers face a much simpler dilemma. If the issue is resolved and
the court concludes that the local churches and schools are not
owned by the diocese, the assets available for corhpensating the
victims will be sharply reduced.
In short, there is a lot to be said for deciding not to decide
the question of who owns the churches and schools in a diocese.
But if the court does wade into these waters, and the state where
the property is located follows the neutral principles approach,
the issue can be resolved the same way it would be resolved if the
property were held by a private business , without runnmg
aground on church-state concerns.

�2

Gerstenblith, supra note 1 1 , at 566.
See AkowJ, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 349, at *9 (refusing to grant preliminary
injunction that would have enjoined archdiocese from closi n g their parish church).
Catharine Wells discusses the archdiocese's conflicting incentives in detail in her
contribution to this symposium. Catharine Pierce Wells, vVho Owns the Local Church?
A Pressing Issue for Dioceses in Bankruptcy, 29 S ET001 HALL LEGIS. J. 375 (2005).
2:\
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Ill.

Bankruptcy Court Scrutiny and Intervention in Church Decision
Making
A second sovereignty-related concern is the danger that the
bankruptcy process may interfere with sovereign decision making.
Chapter 9, the provisions that govern municipal bankruptcy in the
U.S., explicitly addresses this concern by precluding the court
from "interfer [ingJ with . . . any of the political or governmental
,,21
The sovereign bankruptcy proposals that
powers of the debtor.
have been debated in recent years also take these concerns into
account by attempting to minimize the amount of interference
�-'
,,,lith church bankruptcies, by
with sovereign decision making.
con trast, the Bankruptcy Code does not make any special
21;
This leaves the First
concessions to church decision making.
Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as the
principal bulwarks agaInst bankruptcy court interference with
�'
church functions.
The potential friction betw-een the bankruptcy process and
sovereign decision making comes in three areas. The first is the
pervasive bankruptcy oversight of a debtor that files for
Bankruptcy requires extensive disclosure, and it
bankruptcy.
provides sweeping access to a debtor's officers and its financial
�'
As intrusive as this oversight is, however, it does not
records.
seem likely to interfere with church decision making in any
constitutionally impermissible way. Since bankruptcy is a privilege
rather than a right, a church that files for bankruptcy should be
viewed as inviting a certain amount of scrutiny of its financial

�;
�j

11 U.S.C

See,

e_g.,

§ 904(1).
INT'L

MONETARY FUND,

THE

DESIGN

OF

THE

Sm·EREIG:-.J

DEBT

at 7 (Nov. 27, 2002),
availablf at http://www-1rnf.org/extemal/np/pdr/sdrm/2002/112702.pdf (listing,
as one of the principles guiding tbe IMF's proposed framework, that the "mechanism
should not interfere with the sovereignty of debtors").
21i
I have speculated elsewhere that this is probably an accident. The drafters of
the Bankruptcy Code do not seem to have contemplated the possibility that a church
might file for bankruptcy- Skeel, sujJ/U note 3, at 1194_
2;
US CONST. amend. I; Religious Freedom Restoration Act 42 USC. § 2000bb
(1994).
2� See, e.g., 11 USC § 521 (1) (requiring debtor to file list of creditors and
statement of assets and liabilities); FED. R. BAN KR.P. 2004_
RESTRUCTURING MECH.'\NISM - FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS,
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�"
affairs.
The second source of friction is more dramatic. Although the
bankruptcy laws assume that the debtor's existing managers - in
this case the bishop or other church leaders - will continue to run
its financial operations in Chapter 11, creditors are entitled to ask
�L
the court to appoint a trustee.
In a church bankruptcy,
appointment of a trustee would mean wresting control over the
diocese's churches and schools from church officials, and putting
it in the hands of a private, secular decision maker. Just as it is
hard to imagine a sovereign or municipal bankruptcy regime that
purported to dictate political decisions, it is almost inconceivable
that a court would attempt to displace church decision makers in
favor of a trustee. I add the qualifier "almost" because at least one
California court attempted to do essentially the same thing,
appointing a receiver under state law to take over for officials of a
church whose officers had been accused of malfeasance. The
legislature stepped in and passed a statute that effectively
overturned the order, however, and a California appellate court
suggested in dicta that the receivership was probably
H
unconstitutional.
The final friction is the trickiest, since it is much more
intrusive than bankruptcy's disclosure obligations but less
draconian than appointing a trustee. Under the bankruptcy laws ,
any proposal to "use, sell, or lease" property that i s outside of the
"ordinary course of business" is subject to a hearing and "approval
I�
by a bankruptcy court."
This suggests that a church could not
start a substantial new soup kitchen ministry or close and sell a
school during the bankruptcy case unless the bankruptcy judge
gave it the go ahead. The court approval requirement skates quite
close to the First Amendment line, and it is possible that a court
would overturn a bankruptcy judge's veto in an extraordinary

��I

For further discussion of this conclusion, see Skeel, supra note 3, at 1194.
11 U.s.c. § 1104.
\J
People v. Worldwide Church of God, Inc., 178 Cal. Rptr. 913 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981). "How the state ..
can control church property and the receipt and
expenditure of church funds without necessarily becoming involved in the
ecclesiastical funds of the church is difficult to conceive." Id. at 551 (describing the
California legislation).
�� 11 U.S.C.S. § 363(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2005).
Iii

_

2005J
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case.
But several factors argue in favor of generally upholding
the requirement that the bankruptcy court approve extraordinary
transactions. First, the court's role is reactive; it simply approves
or disapproves financial decisions, rather than initiating them.
Perhaps more importantly, if the church felt particularly strongly
about the decision in question, it could ask for its bankruptcy case
3j
to be dismissed. Alternatively, if the church continued with the
case, it could take the requested action after its reorganization
plan was confirmed.
IV.

Confirmation Issues When the Parties Can't Get Along

The final context where sovereignty concerns may
signifi{:antlyalter the reorganization comes as the parties near the
moment of truth, when the time comes to either approve or
disapprove a proposed reorganization plan. Chapter 11 provides
two extremely important "sticks" to move the process along, and
to increase the likelihood that the parties will actually agree to a
consensual reorganization plan. If the debtor is unreasonable,
creditors can ask the court to convert the case from Chapter 1 1 to
Chapter 7, which means appointing a trustee and selling off the
3;
assets. If, on the other hand, a class of creditors is recalcitrant, a
reorganization plan that doesn't fully compensate them can be
"crammed down" over their objections so long as no lower priority
:16
creditors are paid anything.
In a sovereign bankruptcy, liquidation simply would not be a
realistic option. Countries can't be shut down and their assets
:;;
sold for the benefit of their creditors.
Interestingly, the
possibility of liquidating the assets of a church is easier to imagine
- after all, churches are less tied to a physical location than cities
and countries are - but lhe bankruptcy laws take this stick away
from creditors by precluding creditors of a nonprofit corporation
�� It is interesting to note in this regard that § 363 is not one of the provisions
that is incorporated into Chapter 9. See] 1 U.S.C. § 901 (listing provisions from
Chapters 3-11 that are included in Chapter 9). This omission presumably reflects a
conclusion that § 363 oversight is inappropriate for a municipal debtor.
31 Id. § 1112(b) (any party in in terest can ask for dismissal "for cause").
3j Id. § 1122 (conversion to Chapter 7).
3Ii
Id. § 1129 (b) (cramdown) .
37
It probably would not be realistic to shut down a municipality, either, although
two commentators have suggested the possibility. Mc Connell & Picker, sujJ"l"(l note 9.
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1'
from asking the court to convert the case to Chapter 7.- Only the
debtor can seek conversion. As a result, the liquidation stick isn't
available to focus the debtor's attention on striking a deal.
The second stick, cramdown, is not ruled out altogether, but
it too is an awkward fit if the debtor is a church or other sovereign
entity.
The initial problem is one of valuation: In order to
determine whether higher priority creditors can be paid in full, it
is often necessary for the court to determine the value of the
debtor's assets. Valuation is difficult with an ordinary corporate 19
debtor;
the complexity of valuation, as well as related
o
uncertainties, is magnified in the case of a sovereign debtor:
The second difficulty is that cramdown in an ordinary
bankruptcy case usually wipes out the debtor's shareholders, due
to the relentless iogic of insolvency. If higher priority creditors
must be paid in full before lower priority creditors and
shareholders get anything, there won't be anything left over by the
time we get to the shareholders if the company is insolvent.
Wiping out the shareholders of a widely held, for-profit
corporation is relatively straightforward, but it doesn't translate
well into the sovereign context.
Countries do not have
shareholders; they have political leaders and citizens. A literal
application of the cramdown principles seems to suggest that the
sovereign's existing decision makers must be displaced, and their
authority transferred to creditors or their representatives. As
discussed in the last part, this is not somewhere bankruptcy can or
should go.
Notice where this leaves us. Taking away both liquidation
and cramdown would remove two of the key mechanisms that
Chapter 1 1 provides to prod the parties toward agreement. If
neither of the sticks is available, the risk that the negotiated
3,�

1 1 U.s.c. § 1 1 l2 (c).
Bankruptcy lawyers long cited valuation difliculties as an important reason why
consensual reorganization plans have traditionally been more common than
cramdown plans_ See, e.g., David A. Skeel,]r., The Nature and Effect orCmporate Voting
in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. RE,·. 461, 484 (1992); Lynn M. LoPucki &
William C. Whitford, Ba-rgainin g Over Equity's Share in the Brmkmj)tcJ Remganization oj
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. P.-\. L. R.E". 125, 143-58 (1990).
411
An important issue in municipal bankruptcies, for instance, is whether to take
future tax revenues into account in deciding whether to confirm a proposed
reorganization plan; similarly, in a church bankruptcy, it is not clear if future
contributions from parishioners should be considered.
�9
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process will break down will be much higher than in an ordinary
Chapter 1 1 case.
The possibility of impasse is particularly
worrisome in the church bankruptcy context, because dioceses
generally have filed for bankruptcy only after efforts to resolve the
;'
cases brought by clergy misconduct victims collapse.
If the
stalemate continues after the diocese files for bankruptcy, and
bankruptcy's most important sticks are neutralized, the diocese
may simply be unable to propose a confirmable reorganization
plan.
Is there any way out of this impasse? The solution that a few
courts have used in cases involving nonprofit corporations is to
apply a modified version of the cramdown rule in order to avoid
the issue of. whether the existing decision makers must be
displaced. In a case involving a rural electric cooperative, the
Seventh Circuit emphasized that the individuals who controlled
the cooperative were not like ordinary shareholders, since they
;?
had no right to receive the profits of the cooperation. Another
court used similar reasoning with respect to individuals who had
;:1
an interest in a nonprofit hospital that filed for bankruptcy. Both
courts reasoned that the cramdown rule only applies to those who
;;
have a direct financial stake in the debtor.
In a church
bankruptcy, this reasoning would suggest that the absolute priority
rule applies to creditors but not to the church officials who
oversee the diocese.
Unfortunately, actually applying this strategy in a church
bankruptcy would put the bankruptcy court in a very difficult
POSItIon. The churches that have filed for bankruptcy thus far
have had only one real class of creditors, the vast damage claims of
clergy malpractice victims. In effect, the cases boil down to two
11

See, e.g., Stammer, sIjt Jm no te 1, at 1 (quoting letter from Portland Archbishop
Vlazny to parishioners about the diocese's bankruptcy filing, which stated that the
''' pot of gol d is p re tty much empty now"').
1� In reWabash Valley Pt)wer Ass'n, 72 F.3d 1305 (7th Cir. 1995).
1:1
In Fe Whittaker Mem'l Hasp. Ass'n, 149 B. R.812 (Bankr. E.D.Va. 1993).
+I
In In re Fasten1 Maine Electric CoojJerative, Inc., 125 RR. 329 (Bankr. D. Me.
J991), a bankruptcy court held that the absolute priority rule did apply to members
of the electric cooperative that filed for bankruptcy in that case, because the
members' right to recover "patronage capital" made them similar to ordin al)
shareholders. For a brief, useful discussion of the cases, see Gary \tv. Marsh, Intensive
Care: AjJjJlir:aliol1 of the Absolute Priority Rule to Non-Profit Entities, J 7-] AM. BANKR. fNST. J.
'

18 (1998).
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main parties, the church debtor and the class of tort c laims. In
practice, this means that the church's other creditors are likely to
be paid in full, and the sticking point is simply how much to set
aside for the misconduct victims. This is the class that may refuse
to approve a proposed plan, and this is the class that may not be
paid in full.
As a result, in deciding whether to approve a
proposed cramdown plan, the bankruptcy judge would essentially
be required to determine what the payout should be. This would
require her to assess the value of the church's assets (possibly
including the expected future contributions of parishioners) in
order to decide whether to approve the plan.
Rather than
blessing or not blessing an agreement made by the parties, the
judge would be required to pick sides, and in effect to determine
the terms of the reorganization herself.
Another tool that is available in an ordinary Chapter 1 1 case
would lead to the same problems. If a debtor fails to propose a
plan in a timely fashion, the bankruptcy judge can lift the so-called
exclusivity period - the period during which the debtor is the only
one who can propose a reorganization - and permit creditors to
�;
propose their own reorganization plan.
If the victims ask the
bankruptcy judge to take this step, and the judge agrees, the
victims can propose their own cramdown plan, presumably with a
iI)
more attractive proposed payout to the victims. As with a church
proposed cramdown, the bankruptcy judge would be forced to
pick sides when it determined whether to approve the victim
proposed cramdown. With a victim-proposed cramdown, the
analysis would be complicated even further by the possibility that
the payout requirements would effectively tie church leaders'
hands going forward, and thus would risk running aground of
First Amendment concerns.
What, then, is a bankruptcy judge to do? If I were the judge,
and I were forced to give a thumbs up or thumbs down on a
cramdown plan proposed by the church, I would be extremely
1,
Under II U.S.c. § 11 21, only the debtor can file a plan for the first 1 20 days of
the case, but courts can, and often do extend this exclusivity period. See 11 U.s.c. §
1121 (d) (authorizing court to extend or reduce exclusivity period) .
•Ii
For an argument that the exclusivity period should routinely be ended in
ordinary bankruptcy cases after a debtor proposes a cramdown plan that relies on so
called "new value" contributions, see Bruce A. Markell, Owner:s, Auctions, and Absolute
Priority in Bank'IUptcy Remganizations, 44 STAN. L. REv. 69 (1991).

"SOVEREIGNTY" ISSUE)

2005]

359

reluctant to approve the plan. Given the awkward fit between
proposals that leave the debtor's existing operations in place and
the Chapter 1 1 cramduwn rules, and the difficulty of determining
what an acceptable cramdown should look like, I would be
inclined to rej ect any cramdown proposal about which there were
any serious doubts.
The best solution, in my view, would be to leave the issue
open, and indeed to use the uncertainty to encourage the church
and the victims to come to an agreement. A recent case in a very
different context provides a nice analogy of how this might be
don e. In the takeover battle between Oracle and PeopleSoft,
Oracle brought suit in the Delaware Chanc ery Court asking the
court to force PeopleSoft to remove its poison pill takeover
defense. Although Delaware courts have never required a target
like PeopleSoft, who has consistently rejected all takeover offers,
to remove a poison pill, Vice Chancellor Leo Strine hinted that he
j ust might take this step if the part ies failed to settle their
differences. In the face of the uncertainty on both sides as to how
the court would rule, Oracle eventually raised its bid and
PeopleSoft agreed to the takeover. n
In the .church bankruptcy context, the judge may be able to
achieve a similar effect by leaving open both the possibility of a
cramdown bid, and the possibility that she might permit creditors
to propose a reorganization plan if the church drags its feet. This
uncertainty isn 't a perfect substitute for the liquidation and
cramdown options in an ordinary bankruptcy case, but it could
help discourage both sides from digging in their heels and taking
unreasonable positions.

Conclusion

V.

Chapter 1 1 IS an av,Tkward fit for financially troubled
sovereign entItles.
Its provisions> are designed "vith financial
considerations and for profi t entities in mind , not for entities
whose principal purpose is political or religious.
Given this
divergence of focus, it is hardly surprising that Chapter 11 does

4;

Down,

O ' Gara, Judge Wants PeojJleSojt to E:>.jJLain Why It Tu rned Orade
.J REPORT ( Nov. 25, 2(04 ) , available at h ttp : / /java.sys-con.com/ l-ead/

SI!f', e.g. , !vlaureen

4 7 207_p . h tm .
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not provide answers for many of the questions that arise when a
sovereign entity encounters financial distress. This article has
considered a series of issues that seem to fall between the cracks in
one way or another, including the question of who owns church
property; the tension be tween Chapter 1 1 oversight, on the one
hand, and sovereignty or religious freedom concerns , on the
other; and the difficulty of prodding the parties to agreement in a
church bankruptcy case.
In each of these contexts, I have
suggested that the bankruptcy court will often be better off leaving
the issues unresolved, and impressing upon the parties the interest
they have in negotiating to a consensual solution.
By focusing on a series of difficult issues, I don 't mean to
suggest that bankruptcy is an ineffective mechanism for resolving
the financial distress of sovereign entities. Despite the difficulties,
the basic structure of Chapter 1 1 (and Chapter 9) works
surprisingly well in this context. Churchill's famous statement
about democracy seems equally true as a description of the
negotiated Chapter 11 process: It's the worst system imaginable
for dealing with a church or other sovereign bankruptcy, except
for all the rest.

